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CASES NOTED

that the word "safety" was also included in the Coast Guard regulation.'
Liability was imputed for the violation of a statute in a Jones Act case, 0
however, this statute contemplated safety of seamen and foreseeability. The
main contention of the majority in the instant case was "the purpose
of allocating risks between persons who are more nearly on an equal footing
as to financial capacity and ability to avoid the hazards involved." 31 This
reasoning was prognosticated when the Supreme Court of the United States
32
referred to the Jones Act as welfare legislation.
This decision, like many of the decisions under the Jones Act, lightens
the burden for future plaintiff litigants. Because of the vague statutory
construction, it seems that the court often enters into the field of legislation. The thin line between statutory interpretation and actual creation of
a new substantive right is indeterminable. If the present trend in government towards socialization is accepted, no criticism can be made of the
altruistic purposes such decisions pursue. However, certainty in the law
can never be achieved by obvious stretching of legal terms and theories
to reach a decision.
H. T. MALONEY

CIVIL PROCEDU RE-DISCOVERY-INSU RANCE
Plaintiff, in a negligence action, sought discovery of the policy limits
of defendant's automobile liability insurance. Held, policy limits are not
proper matters of discovery under the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.
Brooks v. Owens, 97 So.2d 693 (Fla. 1957).
Since the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure1 and similar
or identical rules by the several states, the interpretation of the scope of
information obtainable by discovery has been in question. The general rule,
as laid down in the leading federal case of Hickman v. Taylor,2 is that
discovery is not a "matter of unqualified right" but will be granted for
"good cause shown" of all "relevant" matters. The purpose of discovery
29. 30 Stat. 102 (1951), 33 U.S.C. § 157 (1952), "The Commandant is empowered

to establish rules as to the lights to be carried . . . as he . . . may deem necessary for
safety
30.'Fegan v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 198 La. 312, 3 So.2d 632 (1941). Here, a U.S.
Department of Commerce regulation was violated and because of the violation, liability
was imposed. However, the court in interpreting the statute said that adherence to the
statute was mandatory, that safety of the employee was intended, and that foresecability
was present.
31. Keman v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 438 (1958). The Court used
these words in stating that this is the reason magnifications have been made to aid
employees in FELA case. Since the FELA reasoning was being applied the purpose of
the reasoning was also applicable.
32. See cases cited at note 12 supra.

1. 335 U.S. 919 (1948); 329 U.S. 837 (1946); 308 U.S. 645 (1938).
2. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
3. Balazs v. Anderson, 77 F. Supp. 612 (N.D. Ohio 1948).
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under the rules was declared "to aid and assist the parties and the court
in the orderly disposition of litigation, but not to supply information for
the personal use of the litigants. '
The relevancy of liability insurance limits has been given diametrically
opposed interpretations in different states. 4 The earliest decision denying
discovery of liability policy limits, decided prior to the new federal rules
and without reference to state rules on discovery, held policy limits "neither
material to the issue nor relevant and competent evidence . . . ." Subsequent decisions in some state and federal courts held liability policy limits
not proper subjects of discovery6 though in other jurisdictions discovery
was allowed for "good8 cause shown" to establish "ownership of a car ' 7 and
"control of a stoop." Other state and federal courts have held liability
policy limits proper matters of discovery on a basis of relevancy.9 The
opposing decisions in Maddox v. Graurman10 and Jeppesen v. Swanson1
made the subject quite popular with legal writers. 12 This precise question
of whether liability policy limits are proper matters of discovery under
the Florida rules had not been decided prior to the instant case. The
Florida rules. involved are almost identical to the corresponding federal

4. Held, not a proper subject of discovery in, federal district courts in Pennsylvania
and Tennessee. State courts in Florida, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey and South
Dakota; Held, a proper subject of discovery in federal district courts in New York and
Tennessee; State courts in California, Illinois and Kentucky. See cases cited notes 5,
6 and 7 infra.
5. Coheen v. Goheen, 9 N.J. Misc. 507, 154 Atl. 393 (1931). (The admissibility
as evidence is not in questipn even in jurisdictions which hold liability insurance limits
a proper subject matter of discovery. "It has been judicially determined that the
introduction of such facts and inquiries tends in actual operation to produce a confusion
of issues in the mind of the jury and an unfair prejudice against one of the parties,
in excess of, and, indeed, in the place of, the legitimate probative effect of such
evidence; in fine, that the true issue before the jury is thereby obscured, rather than
illuminated." Sutton v. Bell, 79 N.J.L. 507, 77 Atl. 42 (1910). See also Annot.,
4 A.L.R. 2d 761 (1949). The question of admissibility as evidence is not treated
in this note.
6. McClure v. Boeger, 105 F. Supp. 612 (E.D. Pa. 1952); McNelly v. Perry,
18 F.R.D. 360 (E.D. Tenn. 1955); Brooks v. Owens, 97 So.2d 693 (Fla. 1957);
Jeppesen v. Swanson, 243 Minn. 547, 68 N.W. 2d-649 (1955); Allen v. District Court,
69 Nev. 196, 245 P.2d 999 (1952); Bean v. Best, 80 N.W. 2d 565 (S. Dak. 1957).
7. Layton v. Cregan and Mallory Co., 263 Mich. 30, 248 N.W. 539 (1933).
8. Martyn v. Braun, 270 App. Div. 768, 59 N.Y.S. 2d 588 (1946).
9. Orgel v. McCurdy, 8 F.R.D. 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); Brackett v. Woodall Food
Products, Inc., 12 F.R.D. 4 (E.D. Tenn. 1951); Superior Insurance Co. v. Superior
Court, 37 Cal. 2d 749, 235 P. 2d 833 (1951); Demarre v. Superior Court, 10 Cal.
2d 99, 73 P. 2d 605 (1937); People v. Fisher, 12 II1.2d 231, 145 N.E. 2d 588 (1957);
Maddox v. Crauman, 265 S.W. 2d 939, (Ky. 1954).

10. 265 S.W. 2d 939 (Ky. 1954).
11. 68 N.W. 2d 649 (Minn. 1955).
12. Morse, Discovery of Liability Limits in Suits Where Insurer is not a Party,
25 Miss. L.J. 147 (1954); Notes, 9 ARK. L. REv. 412 (1955), 34 'lr.xAs L. REV. 129
1955); 9 OKLA. L. REv. 412 (1956), 40 MINN. L. REV. 183 (1956); Young,
iscovery by Plaintiff of Defendant's Liability Insurance Coverage, INs. L.J. 503 (1956);
Lavorci, Disclosure of Insurance Policy Limits, 6 DEPAUL L. REv. 225 (1957). See
also Note, 32 NEB. L. REv. 106 (1952).
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rules.13 Prior to the adoption of the 1954 Florida Rules of Civil Procedure,14
the Supreme Court of Florida held "interrogatories seeking discovery . . .
are properly excluded where they seem to elicit testimony wholly irrele-

vant. ' 15 A party could not insist as a matter of right that his interrogatories
be answered but the matter was within the "sound judicial discretion"

of the trial court.' The extent of examination was subject to the same
limitations as a bill of discovery in equity in aid of an action at law, 17
13.
FLA. R. Giv. P. 1.21(b)
FED.. R. Civ. P. 26(b)
Scope of Examination. Unless otherwise
Scope of Examination. Unless otherwise
ordered by the court as provided herein,
ordered by the court as provided by
the deponent may be examined regarding
Rule 30(b) or (d) the deponent may be
any matter, not privileged, which is
examined regarding any matter, not privirelevant to the subject matter involved in
leged, which is relevant to the subject
the pending action, whether it relates to
matter involved in the pending action,
the claim or defense of the examining
whether it relates to the claim or defense
party, or to the claim or defense of any
of the examining party, or to the claim
other party, including the existance,
or defense of any other party, including
description, nature, custody, condition,
the existance, description, nature, custody,
and location of any books, documents,
condition, and location of any books,
or other tangible things and the identity
documents, or other tangible things and
and location of persons having knowledge
the identity and location of persons having
of relevant facts. It is not ground for
knowledge of relevant facts. It is not
objection that the testimony will be inground for objection that the testimony
admissible at the trial if the testimony
will be inadmissible at the trial if the testisought appears reasonably calculated to
mony sought appears reasonably calculead to the discovery of admissible evilated to lead to the discovery of admissible
dence. [Emphasis supplied].
evidence. (Emphasis supplied].
FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.28
FED. R. Civ. P. 34
Upon motion of any party shoving good
Upon motion of any party showing good
cause therefor and upon notice to all other
cause therefor and upon notice to all other
parties, and subject to the provisions of
parties, and subject to the provisions of
Rule 1.24(b), the court in which an
Rule 30(b), the court in which an action
action is pending may (1) order any party
is pending may (1) order any party to
to provide and permit the inspection and
provide and permit the inspection and
copying or photographing, by or on becopying or photographing, by or on behalf
half of the moving party of any designated
of the moving party of any designated
documents, papers, books, accounts, letdocuments, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects, or tangible
ters, photographs, objects, or tangible
things, not privileged, which constitute or
things, not privileged, which constitute or
contain evidence relating to any of the
contain evidence relating to any of the
matters within the scope of the examinamatters within the scope of the examination permitted by Rule 1.21(b) and
tion permitted by Rule 26(b) and which
which are in his possession, custody, or
are in his possession, custody, or control;
control; or (2) order any party to permit
or (2) order any party to permit entry
entry upon designated land or other
upon designated land or other property
property in his possession or control foi
in his possession or control for the purthe purpose of inspecting measuring, surpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying,
veying, or photographing the property or
or photographing the property or any
any designated object or operation thereon
designated object or operation thereon
within the scope of the examination perwithin the scope of the examination permitted by Rule 1.21(b). The order shall
mitred by Rule 26(b). The order shall
specify the time, place, and manner of
specify the time, place, and manner of
making the inspection and taking the
making the inspection and taking the
copies and photographs and may prescribe
copies and photographs and may presuch terms and conditions as are just.
scribe such terms and conditions as are
[Emphasis supplied.]
just. [Emphasis supplied.]
14. FA. STATS. Vol. 3 (1957).
15. Knight v. Em pire Land Co., 55 Fla. 301, 45 So. 1025 (1908).
16. Mutual Beneficial Health and Accident Ass'n v. Bunting, 133 Fla. 646,
183 So. 321 (1938).
17. Kilgore v. Bird, 150 Fla. 702, 8 So.2d 665 (1942).
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that is, matters essential to the maintenance or defense of an action. 18
The sole purpose of discovery was to procure evidence pertinent to the
issues.' 9 Subsequent to the adoption of the 1954 rules, the court followed
the language of the rules in holding "any matter, not privileged, which
is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, . . .
is a proper subject matter of discovery. 20 The test of relevancy was later
defined as "relevancy to the subject matter of the action rather than the
precise issues framed in the pleadings.'
In the instant case the court clearly and concisely explained the
conflict of decisions in other jurisdictions. The California cases were
distinguished in that the California Code of Civil Procedure lacks provision for discovery in aid of execution, while such discovery is provided
for by the Florida 22 and Federal 3 Rules. The court reasoned that the basic
concept of our judicial system is to insure citizens of this state entry into
the courts for the purpose of (1) proving liability for an injury and
(2) proving damages occasioned thereby. Limits of insurance carried by a
defendant in a cause of action are not relevant to either of those basic
purposes. The court recognized that under some circumstances, information
concerning a policy of insurance may be relevant to the issues of a pending
cause, however, in adopting parts of the Jeppesez 24 opinion it concluded
that the arguments presented for allowing discovery of policy limits were
contrary to the intent of the rules.
The Florida court has taken a position with the majority of states
which hold that discovery of liability policy limits will not be allowed as
an unqualified right because such information in itself does not come
within the scope of relevancy required by the rules. The court indicated
that a party seeking such information may obtain it by discovery if he
can show good cause why the information is relevant.25
The decision of the court in the instant case is a sound interpretation
of the intent of the rules. The theory that liability insurance policies inure
to the benefit of every person who may be negligently injured by the
insured overlooks the fact thatmany operators of motor vehicles are totally
uninsured. "Every argument that can be made in favor of requiring . . .
disclosure could also be made in favor of compelling a defendant in any
civil case, tort or contract, to furnish the plaintiff with full information

18. 27 C. J. S., Discovery § 33 (1941).

19. Jacobs v. Jacobs, 50 So.2d 169 (Fla. 1951); Fofford v. Wofford, 47 So.2d
306 (Fla. 1950).
20. Dupree v. Better Way, Inc., 86 So.2d 425 (Fla. 1956).
21. Charles Sales Corp. v. Rovenger, 88 So.2d 555 (Fla. 1956).
22. FLa. R. Cxv. P. 1.40.
23. FED. R. Civ. P. 69 (a).
24. See note II supra.
25. Brooks v. Owens, 97 So.2d 693 (Fla. 1957) (dictum).
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as to his financial resources, and in the case of an individual as to the full
26
extent of his private fortune."
The theory that such information would lead to more purposeful
discussions of settlement thereby coping with today's congested court
dockets and resulting in more effective judicial administration is weak and
open to attack. Its opponents contend that such procedure casts upon
our judges the additional burden of being an insurance adjuster, and that
only a small percentage of such cases actually go to court.27
It is admitted that some cases are settled below the actual damages
because the plaintiff is unaware of the amount of the defendant's assets.
This is true also in cases not involving insurance. It is felt that this problem
is for the legislature.28 Todays highways are crowded with incompetent
drivers and unroadworthy automobiles. Financial responsibility need not
be demonstrated until the first accident. When these weaknesses in our
laws are corrected by proper legislative enactments, there will be no need
to bend our very excellent rules of procedure.
The dichotomy of decisions is based upon interpretation of the same
rules. Both sides draw their conclusions from the same arguments. It is
interesting to note that within a few days of the Florida decision, 29 the
same point was decided conversely by the Supreme Court of Illinois. 0
The considerations of "the general welfare" as pointed out in Justice
Drew's dissenting opinion and "effective judicial administration" referred
to in People Y. Fisher, 1' the Illinois case, does not justify the straining of
a good rule of procedure. It is strongly contended that the decision of
the court in the instant case is a sound interpretation of the intent of the
rules.
A. JAY CiusToL

26. Annot., 41 A.L.R.2d 968 (1955).
27. See the Amici Curiae brief filed by insurance interests in People v. Fisher,
12 Ill. 2d 231, 145 N. E. 2d 588 (1957).
28. For some interesting aspects of the problem such as compulsory insurance,
arbitration, or compensation, see Kuvin, Auto Liability Insurance: What is Its Future
Course?, Ixs. L. J. 407 (1956).
29. Oct. 25, 1957.
30. People v. Fisher, 12 Ill. 2d 231, 145 N.E. 2d 588 (1957); Sept. 20, 1957,
Modified on Denial of petition of rehearing, Nov. 20, 1957; the court permitted The
American Mutual Insurance Alliances, The Association of Casualty and Surety Companies
and the National Association of Independent Insurers to file a brief as Amici Curiae.
The brief was filed on Oct. 15, 1957 but failed to influence the court's ultimate
decision.
31. Ibid.

